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This Note explores the existing limitation laws followed in the United States and other coun-
tries and demonstrates that these laws have been applied unjustifiably to pleasure craft. It discusses
the proposed limitation alternatives and their treatment of the pleasure craft limitation issue and
offers a workable definition of pleasure craft, which can be used as a starting point for abolishing
pleasure craft limitation of liability. This Note also discusses the inequities caused to claimants by
international disparities in laws regarding pleasure craft limitation and the importance of uniform
exclusion of pleasure craft from limitation schemes.
NOTES
RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL
EXCLUSION OF PLEASURE CRAFT FROM LIMITATION
OF LIABILITY STATUTES
INTRODUCTION
Whether pleasure craft should be covered by the United States
Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act' (Limitation Act or Act)
has been debated for nearly a century. 2 Although courts consis-
tently have held that the Act applies to pleasure craft, 3 this applica-
tion is unwarranted. Congress intended that the Act apply only to
commercial vessels. 4 Furthermore, public policy dictates that
claimants should be compensated fully for injuries they suffer,
absent a sound rationale for denying this compensation. There is no
1. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1976). The Act entitles a shipowner to limit his liability for a
maritime loss to his interest in the vessel and her freight then pending, as long as such loss
occurred without the owner's privity or knowledge. Id. § 183(a). For a discussion of the
privity or knowledge standard, see infra note 6.
2. See generally In re Porter, 272 F. Supp. 282, 286 (S.D. Tex. 1967) ("The sharp
criticism of legal writers and some lower courts concerning applicability of the Act to
pleasure craft indicates there is substantial ground for difference of opinion involving this
controlling question of law."); The Mamie, 5 F. 813, 820 (E.D. Mich.) (Act not intended to
apply to vessels built for purely pleasure purposes), af'd, 8 F. 367 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1881);
Harolds, Limitation of Liability and its Application to Pleasure Boats, 37 TEMp. L.Q. 423
(1964) (pleasure craft limitation is not historically justified); Stolz, Pleasure Boating and
Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CAL. L. REV. 661, 705-19 (1963) (Limitation Act should not be
applied to pleasure craft); Tiffany, Limitation of Liability and Pleasure Boats: 65 Years of
Judicial Misinterpretation of the Intent of Congress, 12 TRANsP. L.J. 249 (1981) (judicial
application of Act to pleasure craft misconstrues the intent of Congress); Note, Shipowners'
Limitation of Liability-New Directions for an Old Doctrine, 16 STAN. L. REV. 370, 382-83
(1964) (extension of limitation of liability to pleasure craft is without merit). But see, e.g., In
re Liebler, 19 F. Supp. 829, 832 (W.D.N.Y. 1937) (1886 amendment extended coverage to all
vessels, regardless of use).
3. See, e.g., Gibboney v. Wright, 517 F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th Cir. 1975) (legislative and
judicial authority exists for. allowing pleasure craft owners to limit their liability); In re
Brown, 536 F. Supp. 750, 751 (N.D. Ohio 1982) ("[O]wner of a pleasure boat, engaged in
non-commercial activities in navigable waters, is entitled to the protection of the Act."); In re
Nelson, 25 F.2d 505, 506 (W.D. Wash. 1928) (1886 amendment extended coverage of
limitation to pleasure craft owners); The Aloha, 228 F. 1006, 1007 (E.D. Va. 1915) (motor-
boat entitled to protection of Limitation Act).
4. See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 331, 715-17 (1851) (main purpose of the
Limitation Act was to equalize the American maritime commercial fleet with that of Eng-
land).
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sound reason for disallowing full recovery to those injured by plea-
sure craft. When pleasure craft inflict injuries5 and their owners are
entitled to limit liability," claimants are often severely undercom-
pensated. 7 Given these inequitable results and the lack of justifica-
tion for them, pleasure craft owners should not be allowed to limit
their liability.
5. In two studies made by Donald Greenman for the Maritime Law Association cover-
ing the years 1953-1981, 16 of 129 cases concerning limitation of liability involved pleasure
craft. D. GREENMAN, MARITIME LAW ASS'N OF THE U.S., Doc. No. 640, STATISTICAL ANALY-
SIS OF LIMITATION OF LIABILITY CASES 7437, 7439 (1982).
6. Pleasure craft owners are often denied the right to limit their liability because they
usually operate their own vessels and, therefore, cannot prove absence of privity or knowl-
edge. See Letter from Robert H. Knight to Hon. Warren G. Magnuson (Feb. 6, 1962),
reprinted in S. REP. No. 1602, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1962). Claimants still suffer,
however, in those instances where privity or knowledge is not found on the part of the owner.
The conduct needed to satisfy the privity or knowledge standard has been the subject of much
debate and academic discussion, see, e.g., Comment, The Role of Privity and Knowledge in
the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act, 23 Loy. L. REv. 480 (1977) (lack of judicial
consistency as to what constitutes privity or knowledge), and has been open to varied judicial
construction. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 877 (2d ed. 1975)
(" 'Privity or knowledge' and 'design or neglect' are phrases devoid of meaning. They are
empty containers into which the courts are free to pour whatever content they will.").
Initially, to achieve the goals set by Congress, see infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text,
courts only found privity or knowledge where the owner directly contributed to the harm
suffered. See, e.g., Lord v. Goodall S.S. Co., 15 F. Cas. 884, 887 (No. 8506) (C.C.D. Cal.
1877) (Privity or knowledge requires "some personal concurrence, or some fault or negligence
on the part of the owner himself, or in which he personally participates."), aff'd, 102 U.S.
541 (1880). Subsequent dissatisfaction with limitation and the Limitation Act, see infra note
8, made courts more willing to find privity or knowledge, and thereby deny an owner's right
to limit his liability. See Watson, The 1976 IMCO Convention: A Comparative View, 15
Hous. L. REV. 249, 271 (1978); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra, at 877-84. In addition,
Congress made it easier to find privity or knowledge when it enacted § 183(e) of the Act. Act
of June 5, 1936, ch. 521, 49 Stat. 1479 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 183(e) (1976)) (privity or
knowledge of the master, superintendent or managing agent of a seagoing vessel is imputed to
the owner). For a general discussion of privity or knowledge, see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
supra, at 877-98.
7. See, e.g., In re Rowley, 425 F. Supp. 116 (D. Idaho 1977) (owner of a pleasure boat,
operated for water skiing in his absence by his 20-year-old daughter, allowed to limit his
liability to the value of his interest in the boat following collision with two floating air
mattresses, causing the death of one child and serious personal Injury to a second child); In re
Hocking, 158 F. Supp. 620 (D.N.J. 1958) (owner's son negligently operated pleasure craft
and owner was entitled to limit his liability to the post-accident value of the vessel
(U.S.$3,500), despite aggregate claims of U.S.$305,000); In re Kellogg, 50 F.2d 957
(D.C.N.Y. 1931) (yacht explosion caused injuries to multiple claimants whose aggregate
claims of roughly U.S.$150,000 would be recoverable only to the extent of the vessel's value
after the accident (U.S.$7,500)).
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Recent attempts to replace the outdated and increasingly un-
popular Act 8 and the equally unsatisfactory Brussels Convention9
produced the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime
Claims 1° (IMCO Convention or Convention), propounded by the
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO),
and the Maritime Law Association (MLA) Proposed Draft Statute
on Limitation" (MLA Statute). Both schemes provide claimants
with greater compensation than they receive under existing limita-
tion laws. 12 Both, however, also extend coverage to pleasure craft. 13
A major reason for including these vessels in the MLA Statute
was the difficulty anticipated by the drafters in finding a satisfac-
tory definition of pleasure craft. 14 Although difficult, this task must
be undertaken. If either proposal is adopted as drafted, claimants
injured by pleasure craft will continue to be undercompensated for
their injuries. Once Congress has defined pleasure craft, it may
8. The dissatisfaction applies to both the Limitation Act and the limitation doctrine in
general. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1954) (Black, J.,
dissenting) ("Many of the conditions in the shipping industry which induced the 1851
Congress to pass the Act no longer prevail."); Pettus v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 322 F.
Supp. 1078, 1082 (W.D. Pa. 1971) ("[L]imitation of liability is an anachronism in this
present day and age."); Comment, Limitation of Liability, 24 NACCA L.J. 223, 225 (1959)
("An act which is vicious in its impact, unconscionable in its results, and outmoded in an age
of institutionalized protective insurance, if it cannot be repealed outright, deserves only a
narrow, grudging and constrictive construction.").
9. International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of
Sea-Going Ships, Oct. 10, 1957, 1957 A.M.C. 1972 [hereinafter cited as Brussels Conven-
tion]. For a discussion of the Brussels Convention and its effect on international uniformity
with respect to pleasure craft limitation, see infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
10. Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, Nov. 19, 1976, 16
I.L.M. 606 (1977) [hereinafter cited as IMCO Convention]. The Inter-Governmental Mari-
time Consultative Organization is a specialized agency of the United Nations, designed to
facilitate intergovernmental cooperation on matters of shipping, navigation and maritime
safety. The Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), 30 U.N.Y.B.
1024 (1976). IMCO changed its name to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) on
May 22, 1982. UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK 1982, at 134 (1982).
11. Proposed Draft Act on Limitation of Liability, in MARITIME LAW ASS'N OF THE U.S.,
Doc. No. 619, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE COMITE MARITIME INTERNATIONAL
AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 7075 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MLA Statute].
12. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text for discussion of the IMCO Convention
and infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text for discussion of the MLA Statute.
14. See MARITIME LAW ASS'N COMM. OF THE C.M.I. COMM. ON LIMITATION OF LIAB.,
COMMENTARY ON THE PROPOSED LIMITATION OF LIABILITY AcT 5 (Latest Working Draft Sept.
20, 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 DRAFT].
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more easily exclude them from the coverage of any limitation
scheme. An acceptable definition of pleasure craft, moreover, could
produce greater international uniformity with respect to pleasure
craft. All nations should exclude these vessels from the protection of
limitation of liability statutes. Only then will the practice of inter-
national forum-shopping be discouraged 5 and claimants injured by
pleasure craft receive the compensation to which they are entitled.
Part I of this Note explores the existing limitation laws fol-
lowed in the United States and other countries and demonstrates
that these laws have been applied unjustifiably to pleasure craft.
Part II discusses the proposed limitation alternatives" and their
treatment of the pleasure craft limitation issue. Part III offers a
workable definition of pleasure craft, which can be used as a start-
ing point for abolishing pleasure craft limitation of liability. Part
IV discusses the inequities caused to claimants by international
disparities in laws regarding pleasure craft limitation and the im-
portance of uniform exclusion of pleasure craft from limitation
schemes.
I. THE CURRENT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
APPLICATION OF LIMITATION OF LIABILITY TO
PLEASURE CRAFT
A. United States: Judicial Failure to Address
the Pleasure Craft Issue
A study of cases involving pleasure craft limitation in the
United States, published in 1964,'1 revealed that courts often have
been silent regarding the reasons for application of the Limitation
Act to pleasure craft.' 8 In fact, United States Supreme Court cases
addressing limitation of liability problems have failed to discuss this
issue. '9 In each case, the Court merely assumed that the Act applied
to pleasure craft. 20
15. See infra notes 117, 126-27 and accompanying text.
16. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
17. Harolds, supra note 2, at 429-35.
18. Id.
19. Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943); Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941);
Spencer Kellogg & Sons v. Hicks, 285 U.S. 502 (1932).
20. In Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943), the Court granted limitation to the owner
of a yacht which exploded due to leaking gas fumes in the engine room, id. at 408-09, after
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Similarly, many lower courts have failed to address adequately
the pleasure craft issue.2 1 Some courts have applied the Act to these
vessels, without discussing the propriety of that application.22 Oth-
ers have addressed the issue, claiming that the inclusion of pleasure
craft is warranted by the Act's 1886 amendment.2 3 Still other courts
have applied the Act to pleasure craft simply because the incident
in question occurred on navigable waters, thereby establishing ad-
miralty jurisdiction.2 4
finding that the owner had no privity or knowledge. Id. The Court ignored the issue of the
applicability of the Act to pleasure craft. In Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941), guests on
board a yacht suffered carbon monoxide poisoning. The lower courts denied the owner's bid
for limitation because he was found to have privity or knowledge of the condition which
caused the injuries. Id. The Supreme Court confirmed the findings, id. at 385, but did not
discuss whether it was proper to extend coverage of the Act to pleasure craft. Lastly, in
Spencer Kellogg & Sons v. Hicks, 285 U.S. 502 (1932), a corporate owner filed a petition to
limit its liability after its gasoline launch, being operated to ferry corporate employees across
the Hudson River, struck an ice floe and sank, resulting in the loss of many lives. Id. at 506-
07. The Court denied the petition because an employee of the corporation was found to have
privity or knowledge of the conditions which led to the accident, and that privity or
knowledge was then imputed to the corporation itself. Id. at 509-11. This case is often cited
as authority for holding that the Act applies to pleasure craft, see Harolds, supra note 2, at
429, but such deference is erroneous for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court in Spencer
Kellogg never addressed the issue of the Act's application to pleasure craft. Second, the vessel
involved in this case was a motor launch, being used in connection with the corporate owner's
business, and not a pleasure vessel. 285 U.S. at 506.
21. Harolds, supra note 2, at 430-35.
22. See, e.g., In re Robertson, 163 F. Supp. 242 (D. Mass. 1958) (collision between a
cabin cruiser being operated negligently by the vessel's skipper while the owner was on board
and a motor boat whose operator was also negligent). See also Harolds, supra note 2, at 430-
32.
23. For example, in In re Liebler, 19 F. Supp. 829 (W.D.N.Y. 1937), a passenger on a
motor boat fell into the water and was fatally injured by the boat's propeller. Id. at 830. The
court ruled that the 1886 amendment extended the Act's coverage to all vessels, regardless of
use. Id. at 832. See also Harolds, supra note 2, at 432-33.
24. See, e.g., In re Madsen, 187 F. Supp. 411 (N.D.N.Y. 1960) (water skier injured by
pleasure speed boat on Lake Pleasant, New York; court denied limitation after ruling that
Lake Pleasant was not a navigable water). See also Harolds, supra note 2, at 433-35. These
cases make the availability of limitation dependent upon the existence of admiralty jurisdic-
tion, and admiralty jurisdiction exists when the incident occurs on a navigable water. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Wurthman, 227 F. Supp. 135, 136-38 (D. Or. 1964) (petition for limitation
must be dismissed where the incident occurs on a non-navigable water, because the courts
lack admiralty jurisdiction). Navigable waters
include the high seas, ports and harbors connected with the high seas, the Great
Lakes, and all the rivers and lakes in the United States which are in fact navigable in
interstate or foreign commerce, regardless of their status as salt or fresh waters, or
their natural or artificial nature, or whether they come within state boundaries.
Comment, Admiralty Jurisdiction Over Pleasure Craft Torts, 36 MD. L. REV. 212, 212 n.2
(1976). See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 31-33.
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Since the 1964 study, many courts have continued to apply the
Act's provisions to pleasure craft, perpetuating the mistake of their
predecessors. 25 Although no authoritative decision has yet to con-
sider the question in depth,26 the courts still cling to the belief that
Congress intended the Act to apply to pleasure craft, despite indica-
tions to the contrary. 27
Cogent arguments have been made for an extension of the Act
to include pleasure craft, 28 but the arguments against such an exten-
sion are more consistent with the Act's legislative history. 29 From its
inception, limitation was "an idea conceived to serve the needs of
commerce." ' 30 The Act, like the limitation doctrine itself, was im-
bued with a commercial purpose: to foster the national commercial
maritime industry. 31 It was enacted to equalize the strength of the
American merchant fleet with that of England. 32 No mention was
25. See, e.g., In re Brown, 536 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (court denied motion to
dismiss pleasure craft owner's petition for limitation of liability); In re Parham, 336 F. Supp.
748 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (explosion on houseboat caused death of claimant's decedent; petition
for limitation denied due to court's finding of owner's privity), aff'd sub nonm. Parham v.
Pelegrin, 468 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1972); Nuccio v. Royal Indem. Co., 280 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.
La. 1968) (cabin cruiser negligently driven into stream's banks; court denied petition for
limitation because owner had delegated control of the vessel to another and had privity or
knowledge of the operator's negligence).
26. Harolds, supra note 2, at 435.
27. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., In re Colonial Trust Co., 124 F. Supp. 73 (D. Conn. 1954) (pleasure craft
industry creates jobs; pleasure craft provide experience in vessel operation and contribute
during wartime or other emergency). See also 1978 Dasrr, supra note 14, at 5 (pleasure craft
are considered "traditional maritime commercial activity" and annual retail sales in the
pleasure craft industry totaled nearly five billion dollars in 1975).
29. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
30. Donovan, The Origins and Development of Limitation of Shipowners' Liability, 53
TUL. L. REv. 999, 999 (1979). Limitation was developed to offset the many risks inherent in
the shipping industry and to encourage shipowners to take those risks. See Purdy, The Recent
Amendment to the Maritime Limitation of Liability Statutes, 5 BROOKLYN L. REV. 42, 43
(1935). By allowing limitation, maritime nations alleviated some of the heavy burden of
financial responsibility which shipowners were forced to bear. Id.
31. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 4, at 715.
32. Senator Hamlin, the limitation bill's author, recognized the need to strengthen the
United States merchant fleet vis-a-vis the British. The Senator reasoned that the fact that the
British government had changed British law pertaining to limitation of liability
is a very strong and established reason why we should place our commercial marine
upon an equal footing with hers. Why not give to those who navigate the ocean as
many inducements to do so as England has done? . . . That is what this bill seeks to
do, and it asks no more.
Id. To achieve this goal, Congress had to enact legislation which would adequately protect
the United States shipowner against the "hazards of transoceanic voyages, and ... give him
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made of the Act's applicability to pleasure craft: its purposes were
purely commercial. 33 The Act, in its 1851 form, therefore, offers no
authority for extending limitation to pleasure craft.
Similarly, although section 183(f), 34 added by amendment to
the Act,35 offers prima facie support for the argument that pleasure
craft owners are entitled to limit their liability, 3 closer scrutiny of
the section reveals the weaknesses in this position. Proponents of
pleasure craft limitation argue that pleasure craft, which are ex-
cluded from section 183(f) ,37 are included elsewhere in the Act. 38
Otherwise, Congress would not have bothered to exclude them
from section 183(f). 39 This argument may appear logical when
based solely upon a literal reading of the Act, but it misconstrues
the language of the section and disregards the commercial purposes
of the Act.
Section 183(f) 40 excludes pleasure craft from the coverage of
subsections 183(b)-(e) .41 It does not affect the treatment of pleasure
every commercial advantage available." Donovan, supra note 30, at 1018-19 (footnote
omitted).
33. See, e.g., The Mamie, 5 F. 813 (E.D. Mich.), af-'d, 8 F. 367 (C.C.E.D. Mich.
1881). The Mamie involved a steam-yacht engaged in travel and occasional fishing expedi-
tions, often for a slight chartering fee. Id. The court held: "[I]t seems ... [clear] that
congress did not intend the act should apply to vessels engaged in purely local trade, and a
fortiori to a vessel not built for the purpose of trade, but of pleasure . Id. at 820. See also
supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
34. 46 U.S.C. § 183(f) (1976). This section provides the following:
As used in subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this section and in section 183b of this
title, the term "seagoing vessel" shall not include pleasure yachts, tugs, towboats,
towing vessels, tank vessels, fishing vessels or their tenders, self-propelled lighters,
nondescript self-propelled vessels, canal boats, scows, car floats, barges, lighters, or
nondescript non-self-propelled vessels, even though the same may be seagoing ves-
sels within the meaning of such term as used in section 188 of this title, as amended.
Id. (emphasis added).
35. Act of June 5, 1936, ch. 521, 49 Stat. 1479 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 183(f) (1976)).
36. See, e.g., Harolds, supra note 2, at 427-28.
37. 46 U.S.C § 183(f) (1976).
38. See, e.g., In re Porter, 272 F. Supp. 282, 286 (S.D. Tex. 1967) ("Congress realized
that ... [pleasure] craft were within the scope of the general limitation provisions of
§ 183(a), but were not to be included ...[in the subsections to which § 183(f) applied].").
39. See, e.g., In re Brown, 536 F. Supp. 750, 751 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (unnecessary to
have excluded pleasure craft from § 183(f) if they had not already been included under
§ 188); In re Liebler, 19 F. Supp. 829, 832 (W.D.N.Y. 1937) ("The evident purpose of the
[1886] amendment in taking out the exception was to make the statute applicable to all
vessels, irrespective of the purposes to which they are put.").
40. 46 U.S.C. § 183(f) (1976).
41. Id. § 183(b)-(e). These subsections, added in 1935, Act of Aug. 29, 1935, ch. 804, 49
Stat. 960, and 1936, Act of June 5, 1936, ch. 521, 49 Stat. 1479, established a minimum
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craft elsewhere in the Act because section 183(f) applies solely to
subsections 183(b)-(e). 42 If pleasure craft were previously included
under section 188, 43 they would continue to be included. 44 The
language of section 183(f) merely allows for the inclusion of plea-
sure craft45 under section 188: it does not compel that result. More-
over, given the commercial emphasis of the Act itself, 46 it is likely
that Congress did not intend to include pleasure craft within section
18847 or any other provision of the Act.
Another reason why these sections48 do not support the exten-
sion of limitation to pleasure craft is that even after their addition
to the Act, the limitation fund under section 183(a)49 continued to
be based in part on the vessel's freight. 50 It would seem anomalous
for Congress to have extended the Act's coverage to pleasure craft
while continuing to base part of the vessel's value (for limitation
fund purposes) on freight, which is defined as "the price or compen-
sation paid for the transportation of goods by carrier."'" The defini-
tion of freight clearly denotes commercial activity.
Another argument against permitting pleasure craft owners to
limit their liability is that, although limitation itself is still justifi-
able as a way of encouraging maritime ventures and maintaining a
competitive maritime commercial fleet, 52 pleasure craft limitation
limitation fund of U.S.$60 per ton where seagoing vessels are involved and personal injury or
death results. 46 U.S.C § 183(b)-(e) (1976).
42. Section 183(f) also applies to § 183b, but that provision is irrelevant to this discus-
sion; section 183b contains the procedural requirements for filing claims and commencing a
suit. 46 U.S.C. § 183b (1976).
43. Id. § 188. Section 188 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided
therein, the provisions. . . of this title shall apply to all seagoing vessels, and also to all vessels
used on lakes or rivers or in inland navigation, including canal boats, barges, and lighters."
Id.
44. Id. § 183(f). See supra note 34.
45. "[T]he term 'seagoing vessel' shall not include pleasure yachts ...even though the
same may be seagoing vessels. . . as used in section 188 of. . .[the Act]." 46 U.S.C. § 183(f)
(1976) (emphasis added). See supra note 34.
46. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
47. 46 U.S.C. § 188 (1976).
48. Id. §§ 183(f), 188.
49. Id. § 183(a).
50. Id. "The liability of the owner ...[shall not exceed] the amount or value of the
interest of such owner in ...[the] vessel, and her freight then pending." Id.
51. BLACK'S LAw DicrIONARY 599 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
52. The United States must continue to be competitive in the world shipping market to
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does not serve the same purposes. 53 There appears to be no rationale
for allowing the owner of a pleasure craft who is not operating his
vessel to limit his liability, even though the individual operating the
vessel does so with the owner's consent and in a reckless or negligent
fashion. 54 With little justification existing for allowing pleasure
craft owners to limit their liability, the Act's coverage should not be
extended to include them.
B. Other Nations: Limitation Under the 1957 Brussels Convention
Many developed countries have adopted limitation schemes
based upon the International Convention Relating to the Limita-
tion of the Liability of Owners of Seagoing Ships55 (Brussels Con-
counter the decline in status which the American merchant marine has suffered. See Note,
supra note 2, at 390 n.135.
53. Martucci, The Maritime Law Association's Proposed Statute on Shipowners' Limi-
tation of Liability: A Practical Alternative to the IMCO Convention, 10 LAW. AM. 839, 862
(1978).
54. For example, in In re Hocking, 158 F. Supp. 620 (D.N.J. 1958), a motorboat owner
was entitled to limit his liability for damages caused by his 15-year-old son who was
operating the vessel with his consent when the accident occurred. Id. at 621-22. Although the
son was negligent in his operation of the boat and was found to be principally at fault, id. at
623, his father, the owner, was entitled to limit his liability to the post-accident value of the
vessel (U.S.$3,500), id. at 622-23, because he was not on board at the time of the accident
and, therefore, lacked privity or knowledge. Id. at 623. The total claims against the owner
had been U.S.$305,000. Id. at 621.
This type of result could not have been intended by Congress when the Act was passed in
1851. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 4, at 715. Professors Gilmore and Black accurately
summarize the judicial lapse which has occurred and the harsh results caused:
The Limitation Act, originally passed to afford a measure of relief to a hard-pressed
and highly competitive industry, has become a charter of irresponsibility for a few
wealthy individuals .... No theory can justify the results .. .[where] the owner
of a yacht or speedboat, who is provident enough to hire someone else to run the
boat for him, is granted a general license to kill and destroy.
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 882 (footnote omitted).
55. Brussels Convention, supra note 9. Among those nations which have ratified the
Brussels Convention are France, Great Britain, Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands. Ratifi-
cation of Convention on Limitation of the Liability of Sea-Going Ships, 1981-1982 ANNUAIRE
COMITt MARITIME INTERNATIONAL 74 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Ratification of Conven-
tion]. See, e.g., Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1958, 6 & 7
Eliz. 2, ch. 62, amending Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., ch. 60. "[Tlhe bulk
...of the [Merchant Shipping] Act of 1958 was designed to give effect by domestic legisla-
tion to the . . .[Brussels Convention]." Coldwell-Horsfall v. West Country Yacht Charters,
1968 P. 341, 347 (1967).
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vention). Although Congress discussed passage of an act based upon
the Brussels Convention, 5 the proposed legislation was ultimately
rejected. 57 The Brussels Convention was sponsored by the world
shipping industry, which sought international uniformity with re-
spect to limitation of liability. 5 Although uniformity was the
goal, 5  it was not achieved with respect to pleasure craft.
The Brussels Convention extends coverage to seagoing ves-
sels,60 but allows each contracting state to determine which vessels
to include in this category.6' Thus, unless all contracting states
define seagoing vessels to exclude pleasure craft, these vessels will be
covered by limitation in some nations but not in others, and uni-
formity will be lost. The results for both pleasure craft owners and
claimants, in this event, could be erratic and harsh.02
Limitation of liability in much of the maritime world, as in the
United States, arose out of commercial necessity.63 Furthermore,
the need to achieve international uniformity with respect to plea-
56. Congress debated passage of a proposed bill entitled Shipowners' Limitation of
Liability Act, 1962, S. 2314, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), which would have given effect to
the Brussels Convention. See S. REP. No. 1602, supra note 6, at 5-6. The purposes of the
proposed act were to replace the 1851 Act and to unify United States law on the subject with
that of other countries. Id.
57. See Rein, International Variations on Concepts of Limitation of Liability, 53 TUL.
L. REV. 1259, 1267 (1979). Part of the reason that the United States rejected the Brussels
Convention was that the Brussels Convention's limitation fund was computed according to a
vessel's tonnage, rather than its value, as it is under the American Limitation Act. See Note,
supra note 2, at 380.
58. Note, Limitation of Shipowners' Liability-The Brussels Convention of 1957, 68
YALE L.J. 1676, 1684 (1959). "It is of great importance that there be international uniformity
in admiralty and maritime law. The rights and liabilities of shipowners and claimants should
not vary depending upon the country in whose courts litigation is brought." Letter from
Edward Gudeman to Hon. Warren G. Magnuson (Mar. 2, 1962), reprinted in S. REP. No.
1602, supra note 6, at 17. For a brief discussion of the importance of international uniformity
with respect to maritime transportation in general, see MARITIME LAW Ass'N OF THE U.S.,
Doc. No. 450, REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON SHIPOWNERS' LIMITATION OF LIABILITY AND THE
COLLISION AND AaEST OF SHIPS CONVENTIONS 4744-46 (1961) [hereinafter cited as CONVEN-
TIONS REPORT].
59. See CONVENTIONS REPORT, supra note 58, at 4744.
60. Brussels Convention, supra note 9, art. 1, para. 1(1).
61. Id. art. 8. The proposed United States legislation, supra note 56, based upon the
Brussels Convention, would have expressly applied to all vessels, including pleasure craft. See
S. REP. No. 1602, supra note 6, at 7.
62. For a discussion of the erratic results of different limitation laws existing in different
countries, see infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
63. See Donovan, supra note 30, at 1000-05.
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sure craft and to compensate claimants for injuries inflicted by
these vessels outweighs any arguments which might be made to
allow pleasure craft owners to limit their liability. Other nations,
therefore, should not allow pleasure craft owners to limit their
liability. The Brussels Convention, which improperly allows for the
inclusion of pleasure craft by contracting states, is unacceptable; it
sanctions "substantial variance"' 4 among the countries which
adopted it. On the international level, as within the United States,
pleasure craft owners should be denied the opportunity to limit
their liability.
II. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE IN LIMITATION
LAWS: CONTINUED APPLICATION TO PLEASURE CRAFT
The maritime nations have recently been presented with an
opportunity to replace their antiquated limitation schemes. The
IMCO Convention 5 has been proposed to update and improve the
limitation law existing under the Brussels Convention.6 6 In addi-
tion, in the United States, the MLA Statute has been presented as
an alternative to the inequitable Limitation Act. 67 Both schemes
would alter substantially the prevailing limitation laws. 8 Unfortu-
nately, although they would greatly increase the compensation
available to claimants after a maritime accident, 69 both alternatives
would also allow pleasure craft owners to limit their liability.
64. Note, supra note 2, at 391.
65. See supra note 10.
66. International Chamber of Shipping Observers' Report on the Diplomatic Confer-
ence on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1 (Nov. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
International Chamber Report] (copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
67. MLA Statute, supra note 11. See MARITIME LAW Ass'N OF THE U.S., Doc. No. 619,
COMMENTARY ON THE PROPOSED LIMITATION OF LIABILITY AcT 7062 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as COMMENTARY].
68. For detailed discussions of these proposals and how they would affect existing
limitation of liability in this country, see Martucci, supra note 53, and Watson, supra note 6.
For discussions of particular problems inherent in the limitation controversy, see generally
Biezup & Abeel, The Limitation Fund and its Distribution, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1185 (1979)
(importance of the limitation fund in the limitation controversy); Buglass, Limitation Of
Liability From A Marine Insurance Viewpoint, 53 TUL. L. REv. 1364 (1979) (limitation of
liability is crucial to marine underwriters); Williams, Limitation of Liability Versus Direct
Action Statutes, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 815 (1975) (desirability of allowing insurance
companies to limit their liability); Comment, supra note 6 (construction of the privity or
knowledge standard in 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976)).
69. See Martucci, supra note 53, at 856-60; Watson, supra note 6, at 272-75.
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A. The IMCO Convention
In November of 1976, an IMCO Diplomatic Conference was
convened in London to consider the viability of a new international
convention on limitation of liability.70 The primary purpose of the
Conference was to replace the 1957 Brussels Convention 71 which
was disliked by both shipowners and claimants of many member
states.72 Although it makes some improvements on the limitation
provisions of the Brussels Convention, 73 the IMCO Convention does
not alter the limitation of liability for pleasure craft owners.
The IMCO Convention applies explicitly to seagoing vessels,
7 4
and whether pleasure craft are to be included within this category
is not made clear. It has been suggested that pleasure craft fall
within the wording of article 15, which allows an individual state
party to choose whether to apply the Convention to, or regulate on
its own, those vessels "intended for navigation on inland water-
ways" and vessels of "less than 300 tons."'7 5 In the absence of
specific contrary notification by a state party, the Convention
would be deemed to apply to these vessels.76 The ambiguity of the
70. International Chamber Report, supra note 66, at 1. The preliminary work on the
new limitation scheme had been undertaken by the Comit6 Maritime International (C.M.I.)
at the Hamburg Conference in 1974. Id. The C.M.I. is a non-governmental organization
dedicated to facilitating and promoting "the unification of maritime and commercial law,
maritime customs usages and practices." COMITP MARITIME INTERNATIONAL CONST. art. 1,
reprinted in 1981-1982 ANNUAIRE COMITt MARITIME INTERNATIONAL 2 (1982).
71. International Chamber Report, supra note 66, at 1.
72. Id.
73. The IMCO Convention increased the standard of conduct required to defeat a
petition for limitation. Id. at 2. The goal was to make limitation "as unbreakable as
possible." Id. The "actual fault or privity" standard of the Brussels Convention, supra note 9,
art. 1, para. 1(1), was replaced by the following: "A person liable shall not be entitled to limit
his liability if it is proved that the loss resulted from his personal act or omission, committed
with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would
probably result." IMCO Convention, supra note 10, art. 4. At the same time, the IMCO
Convention increased the amounts available to claimants under the limitation fund. See
International Chamber Report, supra note 66, at 3.
74. IMCO Convention, supra note 10, art. 1, paras. 1-2.
75. Id. art. 15, para. 2(a)-(b). See Watson, supra note 6, at 260.
76. Watson, supra note 6, at 260. The Convention provides that "[a] State Party which
makes use of the option provided for in this paragraph shall inform the depositary of the
limits of liability adopted in its national legislation or of the fact that there are none." IMCO
Convention, supra note 10, art. 15, para. 2. Great Britain, for example, did make use of this
option. For ships weighing less than 300 tons, Great Britain has chosen to provide limitation
funds which are roughly half of those provided for in article six of the Convention. See
IMCO, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization or its Secretary-General Performs Depos-
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language used in article 15, 77 could lead to uncertainty and miscon-
struction regarding pleasure craft limitation, similar to that caused
by both the Limitation Act and the Brussels Convention.
The information available on the Convention does little to
clarify the ambiguity created by the wording of the text. One
commentator studied an early draft of the Convention 78 and con-
cluded that it granted contracting states the option of either exclud-
ing or including pleasure craft under a certain tonnage. 79
Because pleasure craft owners should not be allowed to limit
their liability, pleasure craft should be excluded from the Conven-
tion's provisions. Furthermore, allowing each contracting state to
establish different rules regarding pleasure craft does not promote
necessary uniformity.80 If the Convention enters into force, 81 plea-
sure craft should be excluded from the provisions allowing limita-
tion of liability.
B. The MLA Statute
When the MLA realized that the IMCO Convention was un-
likely to be adopted by the United States,82 it drafted its own
itary or Other Functions 186 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Status of Conventions] (copy on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
77. IMCO Convention, supra note 10, art. 15.
78. Carbone, Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims: An Analysis of the CMI
Draft Convention as amended by IMCO [1976] 3 COMITi MARITIME INTERNATIONAL, Docu-
MENTATION 166 (1976).
79. Id. at 196. This draft appeared during one of the earlier drafting sessions. Popp,
Comment, 56 CAN. B. REV. 150, 155 (1978). Under the draft's provisions, a party to the
Convention is allowed to exclude, by way of national legislation, ships used for navigation in
inland waterways, and pleasure craft and fishing vessels of less than 20 gross tons. Id.
Deletion of the latter two vessels from the final draft, see IMCO Convention, supra note 10,
art. 15, para. 2, has little practical effect on the pleasure craft limitation issue under the
Convention because pleasure craft typically weigh less than 300 tons, Note, supra note 2, at
383, and are thus excludable. See supra text accompanying note 75.
80. See supra note 58.
81. The Convention has not yet become effective. Of the 12 countries needed to deposit
the instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, IMCO Convention, supra
note 10, art. 17, para. 2, only five have done so. See Status of Conventions, supra note 76, at
184. There are reliable indications, however, that entry into force may be effectuated by late
1983 or 1984. MARITIME LAW Ass'N OF THE U.S., Doc. No. 642, at 7484 (1982).
82. The United States has not adopted the Convention, D. GREENMAN, supra note 5, at
7436, and does not seem likely to do so. MARITIME LAW Ass'N OF THE U.S., Doc. No. 616, at
6968 (1978). A major reason for the unacceptability of the IMCO Convention is the inade-
quacy of the limitation fund it provides. D. GREENMAN, supra note 5, at 7436.
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limitation proposal using the Convention as a model.83 The MLA's
primary goal was to update the existing limitation law in the
United States with new acceptable domestic legislation. 84 Although
the MLA Statute makes many favorable changes in the current
limitation law, including raising substantially the compensation
available to claimants,85 it fails to exclude pleasure craft from its
coverage.
The MLA Statute, like the Convention, does not expressly refer
to pleasure craft. Application to those vessels, however, can be
inferred from the extension of limitation to "any vessel." 86 Further-
more, comments accompanying the MLA Statute provide that
"[t]he Joint Committee has not excluded 'pleasure craft.' "187 In
considering the proposed Draft Statute on Limitation, the MLA's
Committee on Limitation of Liability (Limitation Committee) con-
fronted the issue of pleasure craft limitation.88 It weighed the argu-
ments both for and against exclusion of pleasure craft from the
MLA Statute8 and even excluded them from earlier versions,90 but
deleted the exclusion from the final draft. 9'
A major stumbling block recognized in excluding pleasure
craft was the "great difficulty"9' 2 in finding a workable definition of
these vessels. Although admittedly difficult, this task must be un-
83. MARITIME LAW ASS'N OF THE U.S., Doc. No. 610, at 6797 (1977).
84. Id.
85. See Martucci, supra note 53, at 856-60, which compares the limitation funds
available under the Limitation Act, IMCO Convention and MLA Statute.
86. MLA Statute, supra note 11, § 1(1)-(2).
87. See COMMENTARY, supra note 67, at 7065.
88. See 1978 DRAr, supra note 14, at 3-5.
89. See id. at 4-5. Among the reasons cited for pleasure craft exclusion from the
proposed MLA Statute were the commercial origins of the Limitation Act, id. at 4, the
inequities to claimants caused by pleasure craft limitation, id., the litigation problems which
pleasure craft limitation would create, id., and the absence of public policy reasons for
allowing owners of pleasure craft to limit their liability. Id. The arguments against excluding
pleasure craft were the consistent judicial construction of the Act as including pleasure craft,
id. at 5, the increased recovery maritime claimants would receive under the new statute, id.,
the positive effects which the pleasure craft industry has had on the nation's economy, id.,
and the difficulty of defining which vessels would be considered pleasure craft, were they to
be excluded. Id.
90. See, e.g., MARITIME LAW ASS'N COMM. OF THE C.M.I. COMM. ON LIMITATION OF
LIAR., COMMENTARY ON THE PROPOSED LIMITATION OF LIABILITY ACT 2 (Latest Working Draft
Mar. 2, 1979).
91. See MLA Statute, supra note 11, § 1(2).
92. See 1978 DRAr, supra note 14, at 5.
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dertaken in order to exclude pleasure craft owners from the cover-
age of all limitation schemes.9
3
III. DEFINING PLEASURE CRAFT
The development of an acceptable definition of pleasure craft
must precede uniform exclusion of these vessels from limitation
coverage. Defining pleasure craft is not extremely difficult. Plea-
sure craft are those vessels which are utilized for pleasure activities,
rather than commercial activities. The difficulty lies, however, in
defining pleasure activity in such a way as to meaningfully distin-
guish it from commercial activity. Because of the subjective ele-
ment in determining what constitutes pleasure, the best way to
approach the problem is to determine first what is a commercial
activity.9 4 Thereafter, vessels not utilized for these purposes could
be considered pleasure vessels. 5
Commercial activity is not easily definable. 6 Most definitions
of commerce include some reference to trade or business.9 7 In addi-
93. The Limitation Committee implied that courts could determine which vessels are
pleasure craft for the purpose of exclusion from limitation protection. See id. at 4. Greater
uniformity and certainty would be reached, however, if the courts were provided with some
definition as a starting point.
94. Pleasure is amorphous. Commerce, on the other hand, has been defined repeatedly,
see infra note 97, and provides a more tangible basis on which to ascertain a vessel's function.
95. Commercial and government vessels would seem to comprise those which fall
within the non-pleaure category. Government vessels essentially are those which are used for
public purposes. The distinction between commercial and government vessels is most impor-
tant when the issue of sovereign immunity arises. See, e.g., Flota Maritima Browning de
Cuba v. SS. "Canadian Conqueror," 30 D.L.R.2d 172, 175 (Can. Ex. N.S. Adm. Dist.)
("[N]ot all ships of a foreign sovereign are entitled to immunity, but only those which are
found to be dedicated to public uses."), rev'd, 1962 Can. Exch. 1 (1961), afJ'd, 34 D.L.R.2d
628 (Can. 1962); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976) (foreign
state not immune from United States court jurisdiction where action based upon commercial
activity, as defined in § 1603(d)-(e)). The phrase public "includes such things as ships of war
or vessels sent by the Government on exploring expeditions. It does not mean vessels 'used in
ordinary commerce.' ..." Flota Maritima, 30 D.L.R.2d at 177.
96. Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 597 (1898) (commerce, nevertheless, "is a
term of very large significance").
97. Courts usually define commerce in the constitutional context of interstate com-
merce. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 298 (1936) ("As used in the
Constitution, the word 'commerce' is the equivalent of the phrase 'intercourse for the
purposes of trade,' and includes transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities
... ."(citations omitted)); May v. Sloan, 101 U.S. 231, 237 (1879) (trade, in its broadest
form, "includes not only the business of exchanging commodities by barter, but the business
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tion, for purposes of admiralty, commerce is linked with the busi-
ness of shipping.9 8 Pleasure, on the other hand, is unrelated to
shipping or commerce. °9 The difference between the two activities
is significant enough to allow a distinction to be made for the
purposes of limitation of liability. 00 The following definition is an
example of how pleasure craft might be defined for the purposes of
a limitation statute:
1. This [Limitation] Statute shall not apply to pleasure craft.
Pleasure craft are herein defined as vessels used for primarily
pleasure activities at the time of the incidents which give rise
to claims against those who would have been entitled to limit
their liability under this Statute,' 0' had the incidents oc-
curred while the vessels were being used for primarily com-
mercial activities.
of buying and selling for money, or commerce and traffic generally"); Railroad Co. v. Fuller,
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 560, 568 (1873) ("Commerce is traffic, but it is much more. It embraces
also transportation by land and water, and all the means and appliances necessarily em-
ployed in carrying it on." (citation omitted)); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 76
(1824) ("The correct definition of commerce is the transportation and sale of commodities.").
See also Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913) (commerce not limited to goods but
also includes the transportation of persons). Many federal statutes, in addition, have referred
to commerce in a business context. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1976) (commerce defined as
trade or commerce); id. § 61 (trade or commerce in goods, wares, or merchandise); 18 U.S.C.
§ 31 (1976) (" 'Used for commercial purposes' means the carriage of persons or property for
any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with
any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.").
98. Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1975).
99. Id. "Neither noncommercial fishing nor pleasure boating nor water skiing consti-
tutes commerce." Id. (citations omitted). See Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674, 697 (1893)
(pleasure yachts are "not allowed to transport merchandise or carry passengers for pay" and
are "not authorized to transact business").
100. Other statutes have not let the difficulty of defining pleasure craft prevent the
making of a distinction between commercial and pleasure vessels. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. §
71(a)-(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (different measurement rules for vessels intended for use
exclusively as pleasure vessels and vessels not so intended); id. § 86b(b)(2) (subehapter on
loadline regulations for vessels making foreign sea voyages inapplicable to pleasure craft not
used in trade or commerce); id. § 103 (1976) (repealed 1980) (vessels licensed as exclusively
pleasure vessels not allowed to transport merchandise or carry passengers for pay).
101. Those who are entitled to limit their liability under the Limitation Act are owners,
46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976), and charterers who man, victual, and navigate vessels at their
own expense. Id. § 186. The IMCO Convention extends this privilege to an owner, charterer,
manager and operator of a seagoing ship, IMCO Convention, supra note 10, art. 1, paras. 1-
2; a salvor, id. art. 1, paras. 1, 3; a person for whose act, neglect or default the shipowner or
salvor is responsible, id. art. 1, para. 4, and an insurer. Id. art. 1, para. 6. The MLA Statute
offers the same protection to owners, charterers, managers or operators, MLA Statute, supra
note 11, § I(1)-(2); salvors, id. § 1(1), (3), and insurers. Id. § 1(5).
PLEASURE CRAFT LIMITATION
2. This Statute shall not apply to vessels which are rented,
leased, or chartered,10 2 where such vessels, subsequent to the
renting, leasing, or chartering thereof, are used for primarily
pleasure activities.
This definition resolves two of the problems envisioned by the
Limitation Committee in finding an acceptable definition of plea-
sure craft.10 3 The first problem is categorizing a pleasure vessel
which, on a particular occasion, is used commercially. 104 Under this
definition, the general classification of a vessel is irrelevant. The
deciding factor in determining whether a vessel owner can limit his
liability is the vessel's use at the time of the incident. Thus, a vessel
being used for an activity which is primarily commercial in nature
at the time of the accident would be covered by the limitation
scheme. Conversely, a commercial vessel used primarily for plea-
sure activities when the accident occurs would not be entitled to the
protection of limitation. Whether a vessel's activity is primarily
commercial or pleasure would, of course, require judicial determi-
nation. 05 Furthermore, limitation should protect only those com-
mercial activities which were originally meant to be protected. 106
The second problem foreseen by the Limitation Committee is
the classification of a vessel that is commercially rented or leased
but used by the lessee for pleasure purposes. 0 7 Like the first, this
problem is resolved by the definition's focus on the vessel's use at the
time of the accident. Once the rental transaction is completed, the
commercial activity ends. 08 When the vessel is in the lessee's posses-
102. A charterer is one who hires, leases or engages a vessel for transportation or voyage.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 214 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). A lease is a contract by which one owning
tangible personal property grants to another the right to possess, use and enjoy it for a
specified period of time in exchange for periodic payment of a stipulated price. Id. at 800.
103. 1978 DRAnr, supra note 14, at 5.
104. Id. The reverse problem, how to categorize a commercial vessel which on a
particular occasion is used recreationally, would also be resolved by this definition.
105. A vessel's activity at the time of the accident would be the determining factor.
Thus, a passenger ship such as an ocean liner, ferry, or sightseeing vessel would not be a
pleasure vessel, because it charges passengers a fee to ride on the vessel. A fishing excursion,
on the other hand, would be considered a pleasure activity, unless undertaken for profit.
106. Commercial activities of an illegal nature would be unprotected. Some examples of
illegal activities might be piracy and privateering, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1661 (1976), and
involvement with the slave trade. Id. §§ 1581-1588. Others might be drug trafficking and
exporting goods to or importing goods from an embargoed country.
107. 1978 DRA~r, supra note 14, at 5.
108. See supra note 102.
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sion, therefore, its use is purely recreational and does not fall within
the scope of the limitation statute.109
The foregoing definition is offered only to show how a defini-
tion of pleasure craft might be formulated. It is not the only defini-
tion of pleasure craft which has been proposed in recent years." 0
An earlier definition"' focuses on the vessel's function when the
accident occurs.' l2 It excludes vessels not engaged in trade or com-
merce, under the ordinary meaning of those terms. " 3 Although this
earlier definition makes no express reference to commercial rental
of a vessel for subsequent pleasure activity, its author addressed this
situation." 4 A primary consideration in arguing that the rented
vessel falls under pleasure activity would be the lessee's use of the
vessel for purposes of pleasure. "1 The similarity in the above two
definitions supports the contention that a functional approach
could lead to a workable definition of pleasure craft.
IV. INTERNATIONAL NECESSITY OF EXCLUDING
PLEASURE CRAFT
A workable definition of pleasure craft can enable all maritime
nations to exclude pleasure craft from coverage of limitation of
liability statutes. Achievement of this goal will require the coopera-
tion of all nations, to assure claimants equitable treatment when
injured by pleasure craft. Any non-compliance among the leading
maritime nations will decrease the likelihood of uniformity. With-
out uniformity, claimants will face varying treatment, depending
upon which nation's limitation laws are applied.
109. A vessel's use, which is neither exclusively commercial nor exclusively pleasurable,
but rather a combination of the two, would require a court to determine the vessel's primary
purpose on the particular voyage in question. If primarily commercial, limitation would
apply, but if primarily used for pleasure, it would not.
110. See, e.g., Note, Pleasure Boat Owner Tort Liability in Admiralty: An Examination
of the Limited Liability Act and a Proposal for Reform, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 549, 587 (1977)
(Section 188 of the Act should be amended to exclude pleasure craft, which should be defined
as "any vessel or water craft which at the time of any loss, damage or injury by collision was
engaged in no trade or commerce within the ordinary meaning of those terms.").
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. For example, the earlier definition would exclude a "speedboat towing a water
skier or a yacht cruising on the bay," id., because these activities are not within the ordinary
meaning of trade or commerce. Id. at 588.
114. See id. at 588 n.180.
115. Id.
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In the maritime field, international uniformity is "of vital
importance."'" 6 Uniformity in this area discourages forum-shop-
ping,1 1 7 creates greater certainty for shippers, carriers and insurers
when insuring maritime ventures," 8 and creates administrative
ease in maritime litigation."" Uniformity with respect to limitation
of liability is equally important. Liabilities of shipowners and re-
coveries of claimants should not change from forum to forum.
Although most maritime nations provide limitation of liability in
some form,1 20 the amount of liability varies among the nations,'
2
'
and hence, so does the amount of recovery.
In a limitation proceeding, the law to be applied depends upon
several factors. Among them are the flags of the vessels involved,'
22
the special interest a nation may have in the proceeding,i23 the
place where the injury occurs, 24 and the forum in which the limita-
tion proceeding is instituted. 1 25 For example, if the law of the place
where the tort occurs (lex loci delicti) is applied, a claimant's recov-
ery would depend upon "the wholly fortuitous circumstance of the
place of injury." 26 Likewise, application of the law of the forum
116. Healy, International Uniformity in Maritime Law: The Goal and the Obstacles, 9
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 494, 499 (1979).
117. Id. at 499-500.
118. Id. at 500.
119. Id. at 499. Without uniformity, courts and lawyers would encounter great diffi-
culty when involved in a common situation in which, for example, a collision between a
vessel of one state and a vessel of another, occurring in the territorial waters of a third state, is
litigated in the forum of a fourth state. Id.
120. Note, Demystifying the Application of Foreign Law in a Maritime Limitation
Proceeding: In re Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 12 U. TOL. L. REv. 719, 728 (1981). See
Donovan, supra note 30, at 1000-05.
121. Note, supra note 120, at 728 & n.49. See Rein, supra note 57. Differences in the
laws of various countries result partly from the fact that the United States has not adopted the
Brussels Convention, while other maritime nations have. Healy, supra note 116, at 500. See
supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
122. Staring, Limitation Practice and Procedure, 53 TUL. L. REv. 1134, 1172 (1979).
123. Id.
124. Note, supra note 120, at 728.
125. See The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 29 (1881). The general practice of the United States
courts is to apply United States law to cases brought before them, unless another nation's laws
warrant application. See Note, supra note 120, at 728. An example of a country which might
have a better claim for application of its laws (over the laws of the forum where the suit is
instigated) is one in whose territorial waters the tort occurred. Id.
126. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1959). The
Court said:
To impose on ships the duty of shifting from one standard of compensation to
another as the vessel passes the boundaries of territorial waters would be not only an
440 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:421
(lexfori) would encourage a shipowner to seek a jurisdiction which
would minimize his liability and a claimant to search for a forum
where his recovery would be greatest. 2 7
Although uniform treatment with respect to pleasure craft
limitation is desirable, neither the IMCO Convention nor the MLA
Statute provides it. Similar to prior conventions concerning limita-
tion of liability, 128 the IMCO Convention is intended to bring uni-
formity to the limitation laws of the maritime nations.129 With
respect to pleasure craft, however, the Convention only perpetuates
the inconsistencies created by the Brussels Convention. 30 Article 15
of the IMCO Convention allows state parties to exclude or include
from their implementing legislation, vessels weighing less than 300
tons or vessels used for navigation on inland waterways.'31 Because
most pleasure craft are less than 300 tons, 132 their coverage under
onerous but also an unduly speculative burden, disruptive of international com-
merce and without basis in the expressed policies of this country.
Id. The same rationale holds true with respect to claimants, whose compensation for mari-
time losses should not depend upon where the injury occurred.
127. See, e.g., Black Diamond S.S. Co. v. Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386 (1949). In
Black Diamond, a chartered American vessel collided with a British vessel in Belgium's
territorial waters, Id. at 388. The American charterer petitioned for limitation of liability in
a United States district court, id., but claimed that Belgian law should be applied, id. at 390-
91, because Belgium was the place where the accident occurred. The distinction between the
two laws was significant. Under Belgian law, the maximum liability, based upon the tonnage
of the vessel, was roughly U.S.$325,000. Id. at 391. Under the United States Limitation Act,
however, the post-accident value of the vessel was approximately U.S.$1,000,000. Id. at 389.
The Court recognized the fact that Belgian law could be enforced in American courts but
stated that it had to be specifically pleaded and proved. Id. at 396-97.
128. See Boal, Efforts to Achieve International Uniformity of Laws Relating to the
Limitation of Shipowners' Liability, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1277 (1979).
129. The preamble to the IMCO Convention declares this intention: "THE STATES
PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION, HAVING RECOGNIZED the desirability of deter-
mining by agreement certain uniform rules relating to the limitation of liability for maritime
claims, HAVE DECIDED to conclude a Convention for this purpose. ... IMCO Conven-
tion, supra note 10, preamble.
130. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Brussels Conven-
tion and the option it grants to contracting states, resulting in a loss of uniformity, see supra
notes 60-64 and accompanying text. "[I]nterpretations of the [Brussels] convention will
undoubtedly differ substantially from nation to nation, thereby eliminating any likelihood
that meaningful uniformity will be achieved." Note, supra note 58, at 1714.
131. IMCO Convention, supra note 10, art. 15, para. 2. See supra notes 75-79 and
accompanying text.
132. See Note, supra note 2, at 383.
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the IMCO Convention would be left to the discretion of the state
parties, thereby allowing for disharmonious results. 1
33
Uniformity is desirable, but "[a] bad convention should not . . .
be adopted merely for the sake of uniformity."'13 4 In addition,
because of its other flaws, 35 the IMCO Convention should not be
adopted. A better limitation scheme is needed.
Although the MLA Statute is generally preferable to the IMCO
Convention,136 if enacted, its application would be limited to the
United States. Nonetheless, it can serve as a model for other mari-
time nations. Both the United States and the other maritime nations
must update their limitation laws, and finally exclude pleasure
craft from the new limitation schemes. Absent uniform interna-
tional exclusion of pleasure craft, the inequities caused to claimants
injured by these vessels will continue. Armed with a definition of
pleasure craft, the United States and the other maritime nations can
at last bring justice to pleasure craft injury victims.
CONCLUSION
Application of limitation of liability statutes to pleasure craft
has been tolerated for too long. Claimants unfortunate enough to
133. If one state party chooses to exclude pleasure craft while a second chooses to apply
the Convention, the chances for uniform treatment of these vessels is diminished. The results
to claimants injured by pleasure craft can be erratic. For example, a claimant from state
party A, which allows pleasure craft limitation under the Convention, is injured by a
pleasure craft from state party B, which has chosen to exclude pleasure craft and apply its
own laws to them. Claimant sues in his own state, which follows the Convention. The
Convention provides a fund of 333,000 Units of Account, IMCO Convention, supra note 10,
art. 6, para. l(a)(i), which is roughly U.S.$400,000. See Burr, The IMCO Convention on
Limitation of Shipowners' Liability: Should the United States Ratify?, 10 LAW. AM. 799, 804
& n.28 (1978). The pleasure craft owner, however, files a petition for limitation of liability in
state B, which applies its own limitation law, limiting a shipowner's liability to, say, U.S.
$50,000. If the law of state B is applied, claimant will be limited to a recovery of about one-
eighth of what he would have received, were the law of state A (the Convention) to apply.
The inequities of the results would magnify as the number of claimants dividing the limita-
tion fund increased.
134. Healy, supra note 116, at 502.
135. See Martucci, supra note 53, at 863-64.
136. See id. at 864-67. Two of these reasons are the increased limitation fund under the
MLA Statute, id. at 858-61, and the MLA Statute's requirement that the shipowner prove his
entitlement to limitation, rather than making the claimant disprove that entitlement, as does
the Convention. Id. at 846-49.
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be injured in accidents involving pleasure craft have been under-
compensated. The current United States Limitation Act is out-
moded, inequitable and sorely in need of replacement. Similarly,
the Brussels Convention, followed by many of the maritime na-
tions,13 7 has outlived its usefulness. Neither the IMCO Convention
nor the MLA Statute, however, satisfactorily rectifies the impropri-
ety of allowing pleasure craft owners to limit their liability.
Congress must recognize and act upon the need for change in
this area of the law. Thereafter, other nations should be encour-
aged to follow suit. Absent proper justifications, each wrongdoer
must answer for the harm he causes. Subsidizing pleasure craft
owners was not one of the purposes for which limitation was de-
signed,3 8 and serves only to cause harm to victims of pleasure craft
accidents.139 Armed with a preliminary definition of what consti-
tutes a pleasure vessel, the United States, and the rest of the mari-
time nations, may replace their existing limitation laws and adopt
new schemes, finally excluding pleasure craft from their coverage.
Justice requires that claimants injured by pleasure craft be compen-
sated fully for those injuries.
Charles D. Katz
137. See Ratification of Convention, supra note 55, at 74.
138. See generally Donovan, supra note 30, at 1001-05 (commercial origin of limitation
of liability); Note, supra note 58, at 1685 ("Indeed, the owners of pleasure yachts... are not
engaged in economic competition at all.").
139. See, e.g., Note, supra note 2, at 383 ("The continued concern for the privileges of
yacht and small-boat owners, which has neither competitive nor commercial justification, is
perplexing and reprehensible.").
